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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the impact of site visits on analysts’ forecast accuracy based on a sample of 
analysts’ corporate site visits to Chinese listed firms during 2009-2012. Using a difference-in-
differences approach, we find that analysts who conduct site visits (“visiting analysts”) have a 
greater increase in forecast accuracy than non-visiting analysts. Consistent with the notion that 
site visits facilitate analysts’ information acquisition through observing firms’ operations, we 
find that the results are stronger for manufacturing firms, for firms with more tangible assets, and 
for firms with more concentrated business lines. In addition, we find that the effect of a site visit 
is greater when the site visit is an analyst-only visit, when the current site visit is preceded by 
fewer site visits, and when visiting analysts are located far from the visited firms. Moreover, 
visiting analysts’ forecast revisions are accompanied by a higher market response. Furthermore, 
we find that site visits partially mitigate non-local analysts’ information disadvantage. Lastly, our 
determinant analysis shows that the likelihood of analysts’ site visits increases with the expected 
benefits and decreases with the costs adherent to conducting site visits. Collectively, these results 
indicate that corporate site visits are an important information acquisition activity for analysts.  
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1 Introduction 
The usefulness of analyst research arises from analysts’ skill in processing public 
information and their active information acquisition activities (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 2004; Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 2005). Prior research extensively 
examines how analysts use financial statement information to generate earnings forecasts and 
whether they are efficient in doing so (Bradshaw 2011). Although prior research infers that 
analysts rely on their information acquisition activities (e.g., Chen, Cheng, and Lo 2010), direct 
evidence is limited. Bradshaw (2011) and Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015) call for 
research to better understand analysts’ information acquisition activities. The primary hurdle is 
the lack of data on such activities, which are largely private (Soltes 2014). This study fills the 
void by investigating whether financial analysts obtain useful information to improve the 
accuracy of their earnings forecasts through a specific type of information acquisition activity: 
corporate site visits. 
The prevalence and importance of site visits are evident from the surveys conducted in both 
the U.S. (Brown et al. 2015) and Europe (the 2012 All-Europe Research Team Survey). However, 
in the U.S. and Europe, firms either do not maintain archival records of site visits or prohibit the 
distribution of such information. This study exploits the recent regulation of the mandatory 
disclosure of site visits in China. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) requires listed firms to 
disclose the information related to investors’ site visits in their annual reports starting from 2009. 
This mandatory disclosure requirement provides a unique setting for testing how analysts benefit 
from their corporate site visits. The Chinese setting has another advantage. Listed firms in 
emerging markets such as China operate in an opaque information environment (Morck, Yeung, 
and Yu 2000). Site visits are thus expected to be a relatively more important information source, 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395093 
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complementing public disclosures in the markets, compared with well-developed markets. 
Therefore, examining site visits in China increases the power of the tests in determining the 
effect of analysts’ site visits on their forecast performance. 
Based on prior research and in-depth interviews with investor relations (IR) managers, sell-
side analysts, and fund managers, we expect that analysts can improve their earnings forecast 
accuracy through corporate site visits. In a typical site visit, the visiting analysts engage in face-
to-face talks with IR managers and divisional managers, and then take a tour of the firm’s 
operating and production activities.1 The face-to-face talks can help analysts to gain additional 
details about, and insights into, a firm’s performance. Observing a firm’s operations and facilities, 
such as its factories and business units, allows an analyst to better understand its production 
process, corporate culture, and employee morale, potentially leading to an improvement in her 
forecast accuracy. However, the information obtained from site visits might not be material 
enough to affect analysts’ forecasts of current year’s earnings. Indeed, based on the data of 75 
private interactions between analysts and top executives of one large U.S. firm, Soltes (2014) 
finds no evidence that analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after these private interactions. Thus, 
it is an empirical question whether analysts can improve their forecast accuracy through 
corporate site visits. 
We adopt a difference-in-differences research design to evaluate the effect of site visits on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. We calculate the forecast accuracy changes around site visits and 
then compare the changes between visiting and non-visiting analysts. Our sample consists of 
6,651 site visits to 931 unique firms during 2009-2012. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find 
                                                 
1 According to the corporate site visit policies disclosed by listed firms, IR managers, including board secretaries 
and securities affairs representatives, are usually the liaisons for site visits. They are responsible for approving site 
visit applications, organizing field tours, and accompanying the visitors during the site visits. Our interviews suggest 
that the practice is consistent with these corporate policies.  
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that visiting analysts experience an improvement in forecast accuracy after site visits compared 
to non-visiting analysts. Using alternative approaches to demonstrate the usefulness of site visits, 
we find that the market reaction is greater for the forecast revisions issued by visiting analysts 
than those by non-visiting analysts.  
One salient feature of site visits is that analysts can observe a firm’s operations and 
facilities. In contrast, analysts’ other information acquisition activities, such as hosting investor 
conferences and attending conference calls, are mainly in the form of interacting with top 
executives (Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam 2013; Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi 2014a). 
Consistent with the importance of observing firms’ operations, we document a greater effect of 
site visits to firms in the manufacturing industries, to firms with higher asset tangibility, and to 
firms with more concentrated business lines. Such results highlight the notion that the 
information channels in site visits are different from those in investor conferences, which are 
shown to be more useful for firms with more intangible assets (Green et al. 2014a).  
We next explore the richness of the site visit data, particularly the disclosure of visitors’ 
names. We find that the effect of site visits on analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced for 
the site visits conducted by sell-side analysts only than those conducted jointly by sell-side 
analysts and buy-side investors. This finding suggests that analyst-only site visits are more likely 
to be information acquisition activities, while analysts’ site visits along with buy-side investors 
are, to some extent, client service events, as suggested by Soltes (2014). Moreover, we find that 
the effect of site visits is more pronounced for site visits with fewer preceding site visits and for 
site visits conducted by analysts located far from the visited firms, where the visiting analysts are 
less informed prior to the visits.  
Unlike other types of analysts’ activities, analysts are less likely to interact with top 
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executives during site visits. As shown in Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang (2015), a firm’s top 
executives participate in only 15.2% of the site visits.2 Moreover, if site visits are merely a 
reflection of visiting analysts’ close relationship with top managers, the effect of site visits would 
be stronger for analysts located nearby the firm, whereas the geographic proximity facilitates the 
establishment of private relationship with top executives.3 However, we find that non-local 
analysts benefit more from site visits than local analysts. Furthermore, one might argue that the 
analysts who have better access to management are more likely to conduct site visits and issue 
more accurate forecasts. In one additional analysis, we exclude the analysts who issued strong 
buy recommendations or had investment banking relationship with the visited firm. Our 
inferences remain the same. We also conduct a series of analyses and find that our results are 
unlikely to be driven by managers’ selective disclosure during site visits. 
Another alternative explanation for our results is that capable and well-informed analysts 
choose to conduct site visits and they also issue more accurate forecasts. We do not believe that 
this alternative argument can explain our results because the difference-in-differences research 
design, to a large extent, controls for the potential self-selection issue. Nevertheless, we perform 
two additional analyses to further address this issue. First, we find that visiting and non-visiting 
analysts have similar forecast accuracy in the pre-visit period, inconsistent with the notion that 
visiting analysts are more skilled or better informed. Second, for every site visit to a firm, we 
restrict the non-visiting benchmark group to the analysts who have visited this firm at other times. 
The inferences remain the same. It is, however, possible that analysts’ time-varying access to the 
                                                 
2 Cheng et al. (2015) hand collect the information about firm executives’ participation in site visits from the detailed 
records of 4,425 site visits from the SZSE website in 2013. Please note that it is only in 2013 that firms started to 
provide the detailed minutes of site visits, including whom the visitors meet with during site visits. Such information 
is not available in our sample period. 
3 Prior studies (e.g., Bae, Stulz, and Tan 2008) provide evidence consistent with the argument that analysts are more 
likely to have access to top executives of the firms located in the same area.  
5 
 
information and analysts’ additional research in preparation for site visits, at least partly, drive 
the results.  
Moreover, we use two alternative research designs to examine the improvement in analysts’ 
forecast accuracy after site visits. First, we compare the relative accuracy of forecasts issued by 
an analyst for firms she visits and for firms she does not visit in the same year. Second, we 
compare the relative accuracy of the forecasts issued for the same firm by an analyst between the 
years when she conducts site visits and the years when she does not. For both tests, we hold 
analyst characteristics constant, and in the second test we further hold firm characteristics 
constant. We find that earnings forecasts after site visits are more accurate than other earnings 
forecasts issues by the same analysts. These results mitigate the concern that our results are 
driven by omitted analyst- or firm-characteristics.  
We then link our analyses to the literature on geographic advantage of analysts by 
investigating whether non-local analysts can overcome their information disadvantage through 
site visits. We first confirm that on average local analysts have higher forecast accuracy than 
non-local analysts. However, the forecasts issued by non-local analysts who conduct one site 
visit are as accurate as those issued by local analysts who do not conduct any site visit. If non-
local analysts visit a firm twice or more, their forecasts are more accurate than those issued by 
non-visiting local analysts. 
Lastly, because not all analysts conduct site visits, we conduct a determinant analysis to 
investigate what factors affect analysts’ site visit decision. We find that analysts are less likely to 
visit firms that are geographically far away, but are more likely to visit firms with more tangible 
assets and firms with more concentrated business lines. Analysts from larger brokers are more 
likely to conduct site visits than other analysts. These results indicate that the likelihood of 
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analysts’ site visits increases with the expected benefits and decreases with the costs adherent to 
conducting site visits. 
Our study contributes to the financial analyst research by enhancing our understanding of 
analysts’ information discovery role and by providing direct evidence on the link between 
analysts’ information acquisition activities and their forecast performance. A large body of 
literature explores the factors associated with better forecast performance, including industry 
specialization, firm-specific experience, geographic proximity, and educational ties.4 These 
studies focus more on analysts’ attributes – who they are, and less on what they do (Bradshaw 
2011). Analysts’ information acquisition activities are confidential in nature and the challenge of 
directly observing and measuring their effects has hindered researchers’ ability to understand 
their role in analysts’ forecast performance. We circumvent this issue by relying on a new 
regulation in China that requires firms to disclose information on analysts’ site visits. 
Our study builds on and extends an emerging literature that directly examines analysts’ 
activities. For example, Mayew et al. (2013) focus on analysts who ask questions during 
conference calls and conclude that these analysts have superior private information prior to 
conference calls. Green et al. (2014a, 2014b) focus on analysts hosting investor conferences and 
conclude that these analysts have superior access to management. Using private data from one 
NYSE-listed company, Soltes (2014) examines analysts’ private interactions with managers 
(largely through phone calls) and finds that analysts’ forecast accuracy does not improve 
afterward. Compared with these activities, site visits represent analysts’ proactive information 
acquisition and are featured by analysts’ observing firms’ operation and assets, rather than 
relying only on the discussions with top executives. We show that site visits have a greater effect 
                                                 
4 Please see Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997), Malloy (2005), and Cohen, Frazzini, 
and Malloy (2010) for examples. 
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for firms whose operation is of higher observability. Moreover, thanks to the richness of the data, 
we are able to explore how the usefulness of site visits varies with the characteristics of site visits 
and the visited firms. Such variations help explain why the effect of site visits to one firm, as 
documented in Soltes (2014), might not be generalizable to other firms. Our in-depth field 
interviews also contribute to our understanding of the complex process of analysts’ corporate site 
visits. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on local information advantage. Malloy (2005) 
and later studies (e.g., Bae et al. 2008) show that local analysts issue more accurate forecasts 
than remote analysts. Our results indicate that site visits help non-local analysts to mitigate the 
information disadvantage to a certain extent. 
The findings in the Chinese context are important in their own right given China’s 
increasingly important role in the world economy and the rapid development of its financial 
service industry. Our results should provide suggestive evidence on the role of site visits in the 
U.S. capital markets. Anecdotes of investors’ site visits abound in the U.S., especially in the 
post-Regulation FD period, during which selective disclosure is banned and investors must rely 
more on other means to obtain information (Call, Chen, and Tong 2013; Soltes 2014).5 However, 
we acknowledge the possibility that the institutional differences between China and the U.S. 
might limit the generalizability of our findings.6  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and research design. Section 4 reports 
                                                 
5 Prior research also examines other types of selective access events, such as investors’ private meetings with firm 
executives (Solomon and Soltes 2015). 
6 We would like to point out that China has adopted the U.S. version of Regulation FD by mandating that if an issuer 
discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons, it must make public disclosure of that 
information. According to the Article 41 of the CSRC’s Regulation FD, which took effective on January 31, 2007, 
“A listed company shall, hold conference calls, analysts’ meetings, road shows, accepting investors’ field 
investigation, etc., to communicate with the institutions and individuals about the business operations, financial 
status and other events, but it shall not provide any inside information.”  
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the main analyses and Section 5 additional analyses. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Prior literature, institutional background, and hypothesis development 
2.1 Analysts’ information acquisition and forecast performance 
Analysts are important capital market intermediaries who help decrease the information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan 1990). Their 
superior forecast performance generally arises from their active information acquisition and 
superior information processing skills. Prior studies examine how analysts’ forecast performance 
varies with industry specialization (Jacob et al. 1999), firm-specific experience (Mikhail et al. 
1997), and brokerage firm size (Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999), among other factors. However, 
it is not well understood how analysts’ information acquisition activities influence their forecast 
performance. Recent studies find that analysts who ask questions during conference calls 
(Mayew et al. 2013) or host investor conferences (Green et al. 2014a, 2014b) have superior 
information. However, it is unclear whether their superior performance is driven by the activities 
per se or by self-selection, as skilled or better-connected analysts are more likely to ask questions 
and host conferences.  
In determining the direct effect of an information acquisition activity, ideally the activity 
should benefit the analysts who participate, but not others. This is not the case for investor 
conferences or conference calls, as non-hosting analysts can also attend investor conferences and 
silent analysts can also participate in conference calls and benefit from such activities. In contrast, 
corporate site visits meet this requirement. Corporate site visits exclusively benefit the analysts 
who visit the firm (i.e., visiting analysts). Non-visiting analysts have no direct access to the 
information obtained during site visits. Therefore, one can compare visiting and non-visiting 
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analysts’ forecast accuracy to determine the direct effect of site visits. 
2.2 Corporate site visits and visiting analysts’ information advantage 
2.2.1 Institutional background and the main hypothesis 
Site visits refer to the visits investors pay to firms in order to talk to managers and other 
employees, and to observe the firms’ production activities and operation facilities. To understand 
how, when, and why analysts conduct site visits, we study the related regulations, corporate 
policies, and corporate disclosures on site visits. We also conduct in-depth interviews with three 
IR managers, three sell-side analysts, and three fund managers.7 We include some of the quotes 
below whenever appropriate. We use the insights gained from these materials and field 
interviews to enrich our understanding of the institutional background, to substantiate our 
hypothesis development, and to interpret our empirical results in a broader context.  
Site visits are not restricted to a few favored market participants according to the 
“Guidelines of Investor Relations Management” (referred to as Guidelines hereafter). In Article 
41 of the Guidelines, the SZSE states that “Listed companies should try to accommodate the 
request from investors, analysts, and fund managers to visit company headquarters and project 
sites to the greatest extent.” In the Guidelines, the SZSE emphasizes that “Listed companies 
should arrange the site visits properly so that visitors may better understand the companies’ 
business and operational situations.” According to our interviewees, firms usually do not reject 
site visit requests unless the requested visit occurs in a blackout or sensitive period (e.g., before 
major announcements). Whether analysts can visit firms on their preferred dates depends on the 
negotiation between the firm and the analysts. For example, one interviewed analyst noted that, 
“Companies usually do not say no to site visit requests, but whether you can have your preferred 
                                                 
7 We follow a strict interview protocol, asking the same set of open-ended questions in the same order across all 
interviews. 
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visit time depends on your relative status and long-term relationship with the company.” 
Most site visits are initiated by sell-side analysts. Analysts can go by themselves or along 
with their buy-side clients, depending on whether the visit is mainly an information-acquisition 
or client-service activity. A typical site visit starts with a company briefing and a Q&A session, 
followed by a tour of the firm’s factories and operation facilities. During the site visits, analysts 
engage in face-to-face talks with IR managers and/or other mid-level managers and observe the 
operation process. As one interviewed IR manager and one interviewed analyst described, 
“A typical site visit lasts for three to four hours—one to two hours of talk, followed by a 
two-hour visit to our real-estate development site.”  
 
“Companies are very flexible in accommodating our interview requests. For example, if we 
have a really good discussion session in the morning, and ask to visit the production 
assembly lines in the afternoon, companies do not reject such a request.” 
 
These interactions help analysts to triangulate their model parameters, obtain more detailed 
and contextual information about public announcements, and better understand the firm’s future 
strategy and positioning. The interviewed analysts confirmed that site visits could help them gain 
both earnings and non-earnings related information, such as the contextual factors that are 
filtered out in managers’ announcements due to the constraint of the standardized presentation 
format required by the regulators, the strategic positioning of a certain business unit and a 
product, and other soft information such as the firm’s relationship with local government and 
banks. For example, one interviewed analyst described the information obtained from corporate 
site visits as follows: 
“Most of the discussions focus on two parts: the operational situation and future 
prospects. For the current operational situation, analysts usually ask about the production, 
sales, pricing, market competition, and future expected changes in prices and margins. 
This is relevant to our financial modeling forecasts. We can adjust the model parameters 
based on the information obtained from the site visit. For the future prospects, we want to 
hear about the management team’s strategic planning and their positioning of a certain 
business sector and product line.”  
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In summary, these discussions imply that analysts can improve their forecast accuracy 
through site visits.8 Our first hypothesis is thus stated as follows (in alternative form): 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the forecast accuracy of visiting analysts improves after corporate site 
visits. 
 
However, the information obtained from site visits may not be material enough to affect 
analysts’ forecasts of the current year’s earnings. It is also possible that analysts rely too much 
on the information conveyed by IR managers or employees and do not actively discover new 
information by themselves. If a firm intends to hide information, visiting analysts will obtain few 
informative cues. Moreover, visitors usually do not meet with top executives such as CEOs and 
CFOs during site visits.9 According to some studies (e.g., Bushee, Jung, and Miller 2013), top 
executives are usually the main sources of information; thus analysts might not be able to obtain 
useful information from corporate site visits. These discussions imply that whether visiting 
analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after site visits is an empirical question.  
2.2.2 Cross-sectional variation 
The effectiveness of site visits may vary with the expected benefits from observing the 
production process and facilities, the purpose of the visits, and the quality of the information 
environment faced by the visiting analysts prior to their visits.  
Compared with analysts’ other activities, site visits are featured by the opportunities to 
observe the production process, operating assets, factory assembly lines, and employee morale. 
                                                 
8 In this paper, we focus on forecast accuracy because it is the most frequently studied performance metric of 
analysts in the accounting literature. The information obtained from site visits likely affects forecast accuracy more 
than other performance metrics, such as recommendation profitability. Analysts also have incentives to improve 
their forecast accuracy. In China, analysts’ compensation is largely determined by their annual ranking in 
performance, evaluated by some news media such as New Fortune and Today Investment. While New Fortune’s star 
analyst ranking is largely based on the votes of institutional investors, Today Investment’s star analyst ranking is 
more objective, and one of the awards is explicitly designated for the best analysts with the most accurate earnings 
forecasts in every industry.  
9 As discussed in Cheng et al. (2015), a firm’s top executives participate in only 15.2% of the site visits. 
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We thus expect that the effectiveness of site visits varies with the informativeness of these visual 
cues obtained from such observation. First, we predict that the visual cues are more informative 
for manufacturing firms and firms with more tangible assets because these firms have more 
observable production activities and assets. These predictions are also consistent with analysts’ 
belief. For example, one interviewed analyst noted that “We feel that the observation part of site 
visits is very important when we visit manufacturing firms or firms with more tangible assets.” 
Second, a site visit is more effective if the observed visual cues provide insights into the 
firm’s overall performance to a greater extent. The more concentrated a firm’s business lines, the 
larger the extent to which the on-site operation represents its overall business, and hence the 
more useful the site visits are for visiting analysts to forecast the firm’s operating performance.  
The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy, as stated in H1, is 
more pronounced for manufacturing firms, firms with more tangible assets, and firms with 
more concentrated business lines.  
 
Site visits may serve purposes other than information acquisition. As noted by one 
interviewed analyst, “It serves different purposes when analysts go by themselves versus when 
they invite their buy-side clients along with them. The former do so to look for information and 
potential opportunities, and the latter do so to provide buy-side services.” Prior research also 
indicates that when sell-side analysts conduct site visits with buy-side investors, the primary 
purpose of the visits is to help buy-side clients to gain corporate access (Brown et al. 2015; 
Soltes 2014). Therefore, we expect site visits to have a greater effect on the improvement in 
forecast accuracy when conducted by sell-side analysts only. 
The effectiveness of site visits should also vary with the information environment faced by 
visitors prior to the visits. First, prior research finds that non-local analysts have significant 
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information disadvantage due to the lack of alternative informal channels and local contact 
(Malloy 2005; Bae et al. 2008). This is consistent with our field insights as noted by one analyst, 
“Although local analysts do visit local companies more often, they may have alternative private 
information channels and do not need to rely on site visits as much as non-local analysts.” We 
thus expect non-local analysts to improve more from conducting site visits compared with local 
analysts. Second, a site visit that is preceded by other investors’ site visits may be less 
informative, as visitors in those preceding visits might have already conveyed the same 
information to the market. Such an argument is consistent with the belief of some analysts, as 
summarized by one interviewed analyst: “If the information has already been revealed by a first 
mover, the effect of a follow-up report is rather limited.” It thus follows that the visitors benefit 
more from their site visits if there are fewer site visits prior to theirs.  
The above discussions lead to our third hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy, as stated in H1, is 
more pronounced for analyst-only site visits, for non-local analysts, and for site visits with 
fewer preceding visits . 
 
3 Sample and methodology 
3.1 Sample 
The data on analysts’ corporate site visits to firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) are available from 2009 onward. According to the SZSE Information Fair Disclosure 
Guidelines, effective from August 2006, firms listed on the SZSE must report to the China 
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) two working days before site visits. The firm must 
submit a summary of the site visit to both the CSRC and SZSE after such a visit is conducted. 
However, these reports are not available to the general public. In 2008 the SZSE implemented a 
new disclosure rule mandating that all listed firms disclose the summary information about every 
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site visit in their annual reports starting from 2009.10 The disclosure of site visits is strictly 
enforced. The SZSE publicly denounces firms that fail to disclose site visit information.  
Appendix A provides an example of site visit records showing that investors conduct site 
visits to a firm’s headquarters, operation facilities, and warehouses. The list of site visit records 
occasionally includes non-site-visit events such as telephone interviews, performance illustration 
webinars, email exchanges, non-deal road shows, investor conferences, industry summits and 
forums, and annual broker conferences. We exclude such non-site-visit events from our sample. 
An analyst on average conducts one site visit per year to the firms she follows, although some 
analysts conduct more. As shown in Appendix A, the analyst from GF Securities visited the firm 
on April 12 and again on December 15, 2011.  
We hand-collect the site visit records from the annual reports of the SZSE-listed firms 
during 2009-2012. Our data include the event dates and the names of the visiting institutions. 
Table 1 presents the sample selection procedures. First, we only include the site visits involving 
at least one sell-side Chinese broker.11 We drop the site visits where there are no analyst earnings 
forecast data from the CSMAR database for the visited firms in the current year.12 Second, some 
site visits fall on adjacent dates and we combine them as one site visit event to avoid 
misclassifying visiting analysts as non-visiting analysts. Third, we require that at least one 
                                                 
10 Analysts likely have other non-official means to obtain information on their peers’ site visits. First, occasionally 
there are voluntary disclosures on some firms’ websites about the site visits. But it is unclear how timely or 
comprehensive such disclosures are. Second, based on the authors’ conversations with the analysts who have 
conducted corporate site visits, some analysts may get to know such information from experts’ network (e.g., their 
friends in other brokers covering the same industry) or through their peers’ research reports issued after site visits. 
11 We identify sell-side brokers based on the following process: First, we assign one unique broker ID to each 
broker, even when they take different formats in different firms’ site visit records (e.g., “CITIC Securities,” “CITIC 
Securities Company,” and “CITIC Securities Co. Ltd.,”) or when they change names over the sample period. 
Second, we exclude the buy-side analysts’ visits based on a manual check of the brokers’ websites. This process 
leads to a total of 167 unique brokers, 114 of which are Chinese brokers and 53 of which are foreign brokers. Of the 
114 Chinese brokers, 102 brokers’ forecasts are covered in the CSMAR database. 
12 We match the brokers’ names in the analyst forecast database with those in the site visit database. Because one 
broker usually has only one analyst covering a specific firm, we use “broker” and “analyst” interchangeably when 
discussing forecasts.  
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earnings forecast is issued by visiting analysts during the period from six months before the site 
visit to the end of the first month afterward. This requirement is necessary to test the change in 
an analyst’s forecast accuracy after a site visit. We impose the same requirement for the non-
visiting analysts. Lastly, we exclude financial firms or firms that have missing values for control 
variables in the regressions. 
The final sample includes 6,651 site visits to 931 unique firms between 2009 and 2012. Of 
these site visits, 526 occurred in 2009, 1,323 in 2010, 1,719 in 2011, and 3,083 in 2012. The 
increase in the number of site visits over time is largely driven by the increase in the number of 
firms with site visits, from 159 in 2009 to 765 in 2012, which is consistent with the gradual 
increase in the number of listed firms in the SZSE. The number of visits per firm fluctuates over 
the sample period (3.31 in 2009, 4.41 in 2010, 4.21 in 2011, and 4.03 in 2012).  
In our final sample, the mean (median) number of site visits conducted by the same visiting 
analysts to the same firm in a single year is 1.29 (1.00). Relatedly, we find that 91% of the 
brokers (i.e., their analysts) covered in the CSMAR database visited at least one SZSE firm 
during the sample period.  
3.2 Research design  
To evaluate the effect of site visits, we adopt a difference-in-differences research design by 
comparing the change in forecast accuracy between visiting and non-visiting analysts. We rely 
on the visitors’ names to identify the visiting analysts – the analysts from the brokers whose 
names are listed for a particular site visit. We refer to the analysts who follow the same firms but 
whose brokers’ names are not associated with the site visits as non-visiting analysts.13 While 
there is only one visiting analyst for most site visits, for about 23% of site visits there are 
                                                 
13 We also require that for each site visit event, non-visiting analysts do not conduct any other site visit to the same 
firm during the period beginning from six months before to the end of the first month afterward. This constraint is 
imposed to ensure a clean sample of non-visiting analysts as the benchmark group for such a visit.  
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multiple visiting analysts. In addition, for every site visit, there are many non-visiting analysts, 
whose forecasts serve as the benchmark for that of visiting analysts. To increase the power of the 
test and to avoid the inflation of statistical tests, the unit of analysis is analyst group by site visit. 
Specifically, we calculate forecast accuracy for each analyst group (visiting or non-visiting 
analyst group) based on the group’s consensus forecast in the pre-visit period (i.e., six months 
before the site visit) and post-visit period (i.e., one month after the site visit). The change in 
forecast accuracy for an analyst group controls for the effects of analyst-specific characteristics. 
The difference in the change in forecast accuracy between visiting and non-visiting analyst 
groups controls for the effects of potential concurrent events or firm characteristics that can 
affect analysts’ performance. As such, the difference-in-differences approach captures the effects 
of corporate site visits on visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy.  
3.2.1 Regression model for H1  
We use the following regression to investigate the improvement in visiting analysts’ 
forecast accuracy:  
	߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺ߂ⱨⱷݎⱪݖⱷⱶ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛῼṫⱪݎⅎⱡݔ݌௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾨṣݎⱷⱴⱡݎݏⱪݖⱡ௞,௝,௧ 	
൅ ߛᾬṡṻṡ_ⱦݎⱷݑ݌௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ߛᾪṹẑ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾮṻṱ_ݏݐẛ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾩṱⱶݏݐ_ⱨⱷↄẛⱪⱶⱦ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾭṱⱶẛⱡ݌௝,௧
൅ ߛᾫṣṹ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺΏṭݎⱷݓݐⱨ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺῺṷⱷݏݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺῼṣṯṡẉ௝,௧ ൅ ṱⱶẛݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧
൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧,																																																																																																																																								ሺ1ሻ 
 
where ߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ െሺṿⱷݏݐ_ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṡṫṩ௞,௝,௧ െ ṿݎⱡ_ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṡṫṩ௞,௝,௧ሻ. This variable captures the 
change in forecast accuracy for analyst group k (visiting or non-visiting analyst group) from the 
pre- to the post-visit period for the site visit occurring on day t for firm j; a positive value 
indicates an improvement in forecast accuracy. Because the unit of analysis is site visit-analyst 
group, we have two observations for each site visit, one for the visiting analyst group and the 
other for the non-visiting analyst group. For each analyst group, we calculate the forecast error 
(Pre_Visit_AFE) in the pre-visit period based on the mean of individual analysts’ most recent 
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annual EPS forecasts (i.e., group consensus forecast) in the pre-visit period. Forecast error is 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the group consensus forecast and 
actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year and expressed in percentage.14 
The forecast error in the post-visit period (Post_Visit_AFE) is calculated in the same fashion 
based on the first forecast issued by each analyst in the group in the post-visit period. If a visiting 
(or non-visiting) analyst does not update her forecast during the post-visit period, we assume the 
post-visit forecasts to be the same as the pre-visit forecast.15 The main variable of interest is the 
indicator variable for visiting analysts (Visitk,j,t). The coefficient on this variable captures the 
improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy relative to that of non-visiting analysts. H1 
implies that Visitk,j,t has a positive coefficient. 
Following prior studies, we control for other variables that affect analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. Forecasts issued closer to earnings announcements are more accurate than older 
forecasts (Clement 1999). Thus, we control for the change in forecasting horizon (ΔHorizon), 
which is measured as the natural logarithm of the difference in the mean of the forecasting 
horizon (the number of days) of individual earnings forecasts for each analyst group from the 
pre- to post-visit periods. In addition, because more experienced analysts make more accurate 
earnings forecasts (Mikhail et al. 1997), we control for analysts’ firm-specific experience 
(Firmexp), which is measured as the natural logarithm of the average number of years the 
analysts have been following the firm. Prior literature shows that analysts’ forecast accuracy is 
affected by the size of their brokerage firms, with larger brokers having more resources. Thus, 
                                                 
14 In China, forecast errors, when scaled by stock prices, are usually very small. This is due to the very high PE ratio 
in Chinese stock markets. Our statistics are comparable to those reported in other studies of Chinese financial 
analysts, such as Gu, Li, and Yang (2013). In an untabulated additional analysis, we use the relative forecast 
accuracy score as developed in Hong and Kubik (2003) and our inferences remain the same.  
15 The inferences remain the same when we exclude these analysts from the analyses. Separately, some analysts 
issue a post-visit forecast but not a pre-visit forecast. For these cases, we assume that the pre-visit forecast to be the 
same as the mean value of all other analysts’ pre-visit forecasts. The inferences remain the same if we exclude these 
analysts from the analyses. 
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we control for brokerage firm size (Brokersize), which is measured as the number of unique 
financial analysts working for the broker during the year. As suggested by prior literature, the 
consensus forecast of a larger group of analysts is more accurate. Thus, we control for group size 
(ANA_group), which is measured as the number of analysts in the group. We calculate the above 
variables separately for the visiting and non-visiting analyst groups.  
Lastly, we control for the firm characteristics that can affect the analysts’ forecast accuracy, 
including institutional ownership (Inst_holding), board independence (Indep), firm size (MV), 
book-to-market ratio (BM), buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), earnings volatility (NI_std), 
sales growth (Growth), and a loss firm indicator (Loss). Appendix B provides the definitions of 
these variables. We also include industry fixed effects in the regression model. The t-values are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year level clustering.  
3.2.2 Regression models for H2 and H3 
To test H2, we expand Equation (1) by adding the interaction terms between the indicator 
for visiting analysts and the firm characteristics capturing the effectiveness of on-site observation: 
߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼṫⱪݎⅎ_ẚⱨẘݎ௝,௧ ൅ ߚᾨẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ṫⱪݎⅎ_ẚⱨẘݎ௝,௧ ൅ ʠɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅
ߝ௞,௝,௧,		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ሺ2ሻ 
 
where Firm_char refers to one of the three indicator variables for manufacturing firms, firms 
with high asset tangibility, and firms with high business concentration, respectively. H2 implies 
that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive. 
H3 predicts that the effect of a site visit depends on whether it serves the purposes of buy-
side client service or information acquisition, whether the visiting analysts are non-local analysts, 
and whether there are fewer preceding visits. Note that these partitions are only relevant for the 
visiting analysts. Therefore, to test H3, we add to Equation (1) only the interaction term of Visit 
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and the indicator for the partition without adding the standalone variables:16  
߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ẚⱨẘݎ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧,		 ሺ3ሻ	
where Visit_char is an indicator variable that equals one separately for visiting analyst 
observations when site visits involve sell-side analysts only, when site visits are dominated by 
non-local analysts, and when site visits are preceded with fewer site visits; it is equal to zero for 
other visiting analyst observations and for all of the non-visiting analyst observations. Appendix 
B provides detailed definitions of these indicator variables. H3 implies that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive. 
  
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Univariate tests 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on forecast accuracy. As shown in the table, 
visiting and non-visiting analysts have similar forecast accuracy in the pre-site-visit period. 
However, in the post-site-visit period, the visiting analysts have significantly lower forecast 
errors (1.077 vs. 1.201 with p-value=0.01) and therefore higher forecast accuracy than the non-
visiting analysts. As a result, the visiting analysts experience a much more pronounced 
improvement in forecast accuracy (0.164 vs. 0.041 with p-value = 0.00), consistent with H1.  
Table 2 also reports the descriptive statistics on other variables for our main analyses. 
Recall that for each site visit event, analyst-specific characteristics are different for visiting and 
non-visiting analyst groups, but the firm-specific characteristics are the same for both groups. 
Therefore, we present the descriptive statistics for the analyst-related variables separately for the 
                                                 
16 The objective of H3 is to test whether the usefulness of site visits varies with the characteristics of site visits or 
visiting analyst groups, and they are not relevant for non-visiting analysts. When we include the main effect of these 
variables in an untabulated analysis, the inferences remain the same. Also while we include the interaction terms 
separately in the regression, the results are quantitatively similar when we include all interaction terms in the same 
regression model (untabulated). 
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two subsamples. We observe that visiting analysts have a smaller change in forecast horizon 
(ΔHorizon), have slightly more firm-specific experience on average, and are more likely to work 
for larger brokers than non-visiting analysts. The average number of analysts is only 1.385 for 
the visiting analyst group but 7.234 for the non-visiting group. This notable difference in group 
size indicates that financial analysts usually do not cluster in one specific site visit when 
scheduling their visits to a firm.  
As for the firm characteristics, the average market value is RMB10.3 billion (around 
US$1.6 billion), the average institutional ownership is 44%, the average book-to-market ratio is 
0.360, and the average sales growth is 28%. Most firms have board independence lower than 
40%. More than half of the sample firms have board independence equal to exactly 33% because 
of the CSRC’s regulatory requirement that at least one-third of board directors be independent. 
Consistent with the general listed firm population, only 1% of the visited firms are loss firms. 
Lastly, the sample firms have skewed buy-and-hold market-adjusted annual returns, with a mean 
of 15% but a median of 1%. 
4.2 Multivariate test for H1 
Table 3 reports the multivariate regression results for H1. Consistent with the univariate 
analysis, we find that visiting analysts experience a larger improvement in their forecast accuracy 
compared with non-visiting analysts. The coefficient on Visit is significantly positive at the 0.01 
level (coefficient = 0.1292 with t = 5.13). This effect is also economically significant. The 
magnitude of the coefficient on Visit implies a relative improvement in forecast accuracy of 
about 10% based on the mean pre-visit forecast error of the visiting or non-visiting analyst 
groups (1.24, as presented in Table 2). This result is consistent with H1 that analysts obtain 
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useful information for earnings forecasts during their site visits.17 This result is also consistent 
with analysts’ belief, as stated by one interviewed analyst, that “Site visits are the most important 
information channel for sell-side analysts to acquire information. I spend two-thirds of my 
working time on the road visiting companies.” 
In terms of control variables, we find that the coefficient on ΔHorizon is significantly 
positive, implying that the post-visit forecasts are more accurate than the pre-visit forecasts, 
which have a longer horizon. Analysts from larger brokerage firms and those who cover larger 
firms experience a smaller improvement, likely because they are more informed in the pre-visit 
period. In comparison, we find that analysts experience a larger improvement in forecast 
accuracy for firms with higher earnings volatility, firms with higher book-to-market ratios, and 
loss firms.  
In summary, visiting analysts experience a larger improvement in forecast accuracy than 
non-visiting analysts after controlling for other potential determinants. This finding implies that 
analysts obtain information from site visits that is useful for their earnings forecasts.  
4.3 Cross-sectional analyses for H2 
Table 4 reports the results from the test of H2. We construct indicator variables for 
manufacturing firms (Manufacture), for firms with a higher level of tangible assets (Tangibility), 
and for firms with more concentrated business lines (Concentration). Based on the CSRC’s 
industry classification, 66.1% of site visits are paid to manufacturing firms, as shown in Table 2. 
Tangibility equals 1 when the ratio of PP&E over total assets is greater than the sample median, 
and 0 otherwise. The average PP&E/total assets is 0.23. To capture a firm’s business 
concentration, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of a firm’s segment sales. The 
                                                 
17 Our interview suggests that the site visits that occur in the month after quarterly earnings announcements or the 
initial announcements of mergers & acquisitions are likely to be initiated by the firms, rather than by the analysts. 
Our conclusions still hold after excluding these site visits.  
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average HHI is 0.604. Concentration equals 1 when the HHI of segment sales is greater than the 
sample median, and 0 otherwise.  
As shown in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4, the coefficients on the interaction terms, 
Visit×Manufacture, Visit×Tangibility, and Visit×Concentration, are positive and significant at 
the 0.05 level or better (t = 2.08, 2.30, and 2.81, respectively). These results are consistent with 
H2 that analysts experience a larger improvement in forecast accuracy when they conduct site 
visits to manufacturing firms, to firms with more tangible assets, and to firms with more 
concentrated business.  
4.4 Cross-sectional analyses for H3 
To test H3, we construct an indicator for site visits that are conducted by sell-side analysts 
only (AnalystOnly), which equals 1 for analyst-only visiting groups, and 0 for visiting groups 
involving non-analyst visitors (typically buy-side investors). Table 2 shows that 37% of the site 
visits are analyst-only visits. Column (1) of Table 5 presents the regression results. We find a 
positive coefficient on Visit×AnalystOnly (t = 7.07), suggesting that site visits are more effective 
in improving forecast accuracy when they are conducted by analysts only. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that sell-side analysts often accompany their clients during corporate 
site visits as their client service trips rather than as trips for information acquisition, as noted by 
one of the interviewed fund managers: “Sell-side analysts have quotas to organize site visit tours, 
which are viewed as part of their services.” 
To test the incremental effect of site visits for non-local visiting analysts, we construct an 
indicator for site visits dominated by non-local visiting analysts (Remote) (i.e., visits in which 
non-local visiting analysts outnumber local visiting analysts in attendance). Non-local analysts 
refer to the analysts whose brokerage firms are located more than 400 kilometers away from the 
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visited firm’s headquarters. As shown in Table 2, for 72.7% of the site visits, the visiting analysts 
consist mainly of non-local analysts. Column (2) of Table 5 presents the regression results. 
Consistent with the prediction, we find a positive coefficient on Visit×Remote (t = 9.90).  
Similarly, to test the incremental effect of site visits with fewer preceding visits, we 
construct an indicator variable (Unpreceded) for site visits with fewer than the median number of 
site visits conducted in the preceding month. As reported in Table 2, on average there are about 
1.7 site visits conducted in the month before the current site visit. Column (3) of Table 5 presents 
the regression results. We find a positive coefficient on Visit×Unpreceded (t = 2.84).  
In sum, consistent with H3, site visits are more effective in improving forecast accuracy 
when they are conducted by analysts only and by analysts who are located farther away from the 
visited firms, and when they are preceded by fewer site visits.  
 
5 Additional analyses  
5.1 An alternative explanation – self-selection of visiting analysts 
It is possible that skilled analysts are more likely to conduct site visits and they also 
produce more accurate forecasts, leading to a positive association between site visits and forecast 
accuracy. Another possibility is that analysts choose to visit the firms that they are more familiar 
with and hence they produce more accurate forecasts based on their superior prior knowledge 
about this firm. If these alternative explanations are valid, we should expect that visiting analysts 
have more accurate earnings forecasts than non-visiting analysts in the pre-visit period. However, 
as reported in Table 2, the forecast accuracy of visiting analysts is similar to that of non-visiting 
analysts in the pre-visit period. To ensure that the univariate results are not driven by 
confounding factors, we also conduct a multivariate analysis of the level of forecast accuracy in 
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the pre-visit period. As reported in Column (1) of Table 6, we find that there is no significant 
difference in forecast accuracy between visiting and non-visiting analysts in the pre-visit period; 
the coefficient on the site visit indicator variable (Visit) is insignificant at conventional levels (t = 
-0.35).   
In contrast, when we examine the post-visit level of forecast accuracy, we find that forecast 
accuracy is higher for visiting analysts than for non-visiting analysts, as reported in Column (2) 
of Table 6. The coefficient on Visit is significantly positive (t = 3.07). Therefore, the relative 
improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy is driven by their more accurate post-visit 
forecasts. This is further supported by the regression results reported in Column (3), where we 
include both pre- and post-visit observations and add to the regression the post-visit indicator 
(Post) and its interaction with Visit. We find that the coefficient on Visit is still insignificant (t=-
0.24), but that on Visit×Post is significantly positive (t = 5.67). Such a finding suggests that 
visiting analysts have similar forecast accuracy as non-visiting analysts before the site visit; 
however, after the site visit they show greater forecast accuracy than non-visiting analysts. 
To further address the self-selection issue, we impose additional requirement on the 
benchmark group. Specifically, for each firm we exclude the non-visiting analysts who did not 
conduct any site visit to the firm over the sample period. As such, the reduced non-visiting 
analyst group only consists of the analysts who visit the firm at other times. This additional data 
requirement ensures that visiting and non-visiting analysts more comparable in terms of 
conducting site visits to the same firm; they just visit the firm at a different time. Column (1) of 
Table 7 presents the regression results for this sample. The coefficient on Visit remains 
significantly positive (t = 6.94), suggesting that the improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast 
accuracy is due to the information obtained from site visits, not due to their choice of conducting 
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site visits. 
In the same vein, it is possible that analysts with better access to managers are more likely 
to conduct site visits and are more capable of acquiring information during site visits. To address 
this concern, we exclude the analysts who issue strong-buy recommendations in the year prior to 
site visits and those analysts who have investment banking relationship with the firm in the past, 
the analysts who presumably have better access to managers. The regression results for this 
sample are reported in Column (2) of Table 7. Our inferences remain the same: the coefficient on 
Visit is significantly positive (t = 5.67).  
In summary, these additional analyses indicate that our results are not driven by the 
alternative explanations based on the self-selection of visiting analysts.  
5.2 An alternative explanation – Selective disclosure 
It is unclear whether the benefits of site visits come from analysts putting together an 
information mosaic, as discussed above, or from managers’ selective disclosure during analysts’ 
site visits. While selective disclosure is clandestine to detect, we identify two cases where 
selective disclosure is more likely to occur and then examine whether our results are stronger in 
these cases. First, we expect that selective disclosure is more likely to occur during site visits to 
the firms that violated disclosure rules and later were investigated by the regulators. Second, we 
expect that analysts with favorable relationship with the firm are more likely to visit the firm 
regularly and selective disclosure is more likely to occur during their visits. However, in 
untabulated analyses, we find that site visits in these cases are not more useful than others. That 
is, we fail to find any evidence consistent with the alternative explanation based on selective 
disclosure.18 Despite these results, we would like to note that selective disclosure is hard to 
                                                 
18 To the extent that selective disclosure is more likely to occur during the visits of the analysts who have favorable 
opinions towards the firm, the robust results after excluding the site visits conducted by the analysts who have issued 
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detect by nature and we leave it to future research to investigate to what extent the benefits we 
document are driven by managers’ selective disclosure. 
5.3 Alternative research design - Comparison based on the same-analyst observations  
Our analyses above are based on the comparison between visiting and non-visiting analysts. 
We use the difference-in-differences design to address potential omitted analyst characteristics. 
To further address the concern that some unobservable factors might affect visiting and non-
visiting analysts differently, we use the observations from the same visiting analysts and conduct 
two tests to examine whether analyst forecast accuracy experiences an improvement after site 
visits. In the first test, we compare the relative accuracy of earnings forecasts issued for firms 
visited by an analyst versus that for firms not visited by the same analyst in the same year. If site 
visits are useful in improving forecast accuracy, the relative forecast accuracy should be higher 
for the former than for the latter. In the second test, we focus on analyst-firm pairs and compare 
the relative forecast accuracy in the years when an analyst visits the firm versus in the years 
when she does not visit the same firm. Again, if site visits are useful in improving forecast 
accuracy, the relative forecast accuracy should be higher in the former than in the latter.  
Under the alternative research design, the unit of analysis is analyst-firm-year. As in Bae et 
al. (2008), we calculate the relative forecast accuracy measure (Rel_Accuracy ) as follows: 
ẉⱡↄ_ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ሺെ1ሻ ൈ ᾡῲῴӲ,Ӵ,Ԉିᾡ௩௚_ᾡῲῴӴ,Ԉᾡ௩௚_ᾡῲῴӴ,Ԉ , 
where AFEi,j,t is the forecast error of analyst i for firm j in year t. For each analyst, we calculate 
forecast error using the analyst’s most recent annual earnings forecast issued in the year before 
the firm’s earnings announcement. Avg_AFEj,t is the mean forecast error of all analysts who 
cover firm j in fiscal year t. A positive value of Rel_Accuracy indicates that the forecast error of 
                                                                                                                                                             
strong-buy recommendations recently for the firm or by those with investment banking relationship with the firm, as 
reported in Column (2) of Table 7, also suggest that selective disclosure is not driving our results.  
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analyst i for firm j in year t is smaller than the average forecast error for firm j in year t. We then 
estimate the following regression to test whether site visits are useful in improving forecast 
accuracy: 
ẉⱡↄ_ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṫݎⱡݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧																						ሺ4ሻ 
 
We define the count variable Visit_freqi,j,t as 2 (1, 0) if analyst i visits firm j two or more (one, 
zero) times in the six-month period before the issuance date of the most recent earnings forecast, 
or in the period between last year’s earnings announcement date and the issuance date of the 
most recent earnings forecast, whichever is longer.19  
Table 8 reports the regression results, Column (1) for the comparison across firms followed 
by the same analyst within the same year, and Column (2) for the comparison across years within 
the same analyst-firm pair. As reported in the table, the coefficient on Visit_freq is significantly 
positive in both columns (t = 10.63 and 4.36, respectively). These results suggest that analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for a firm are more accurate when analysts visit this firm than their forecasts 
for the firms that they do not visit in the same year, or than their forecasts for the same firm but 
in the years they do not visit it. Overall, these analyses indicate that our inferences are not driven 
by the unobservable analyst or firm characteristics. 
5.4 Investors’ response to visiting analysts’ forecast revisions after site visits 
Visiting analysts usually disclose in their reports that their earnings forecasts and 
recommendations are based on the recent site visits.20 To the extent that investors are aware of 
the usefulness of analysts’ site visits, we expect that conducting site visits increases the 
                                                 
19 Due to the data requirement for calculating Visit_freq (i.e., information related to site visit frequencies in the past 
six months), the sample of earnings forecasts includes those with forecasting dates of July 2009 onward. 
20 Based on a sample of 250 randomly selected analyst reports that were issued by the visiting analysts in the month 
after their site visits, we find that 186 of these reports prominently use the term “site visit” in the report titles, in 
various forms such as “site visit briefing,” “site visit report,” or “site visit bulletin.” For the remaining reports, 8 
reports mention “site visit” as one of the information sources in the textual body of the reports. In total, 77.6% (= 
(186+8)/250) of the randomly selected analyst reports explicitly disclose analysts’ recent site visits.  
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credibility of the earnings forecasts issued by visiting analysts after site visits. This is consistent 
with the insights obtained from our interviews, as noted by one interviewed analyst: “The 
credibility of such a report is greatly enhanced if my interpretation of the past and my predictions 
of the future are echoed by company managers. This not only boosts my confidence in my 
reports, but also makes them more convincing for the readers.”  
Following prior studies (e.g., Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia 1995; Clement and Tse 
2003; Keung 2010), we measure the perceived credibility of earnings forecasts using the forecast 
response coefficient for forecast revisions. We then investigate whether the market reaction to 
the same unit of forecast revision is larger when such forecast revisions are issued by visiting 
analysts after site visits. For this purpose, we estimate the following regression model:  
ṥṡẉ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺṩṫ_ẉⱡݒ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼẑⱪݏⱪݐ_݌ݎⱡݒ_ⅎⱷⱶݐⱨ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚᾨṩṫ_ẉⱡݒ௜,௝,௧ ൈ ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_݌ݎⱡݒ_ⅎⱷⱶݐⱨ௜,௝,௧
൅ ᅷ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧	,																																																																																																									ሺ5ሻ	 
 
CAR is measured as the three-day cumulative size-adjusted return surrounding the earnings 
forecast revision. Earnings forecast revision (EF_Rev) is measured as the difference between an 
analyst’s annual earnings forecast for the current year and his/her own prior earnings forecast, 
scaled by the stock price at the end of the month before the revision. To capture analysts’ site 
visit activities, we use the indicator variable Visit_prev_monthi,j,t, which equals 1 if analyst i 
visited firm j in the month before the current forecast revision, and 0 otherwise. We require the 
sample firms to have at least one forecast revision observation with Visit_ prev_month = 1 and at 
least one forecast revision observation with Visit_ prev_month = 0 over the sample period. Of the 
sample of 17,317 forecast revisions, 11.97% are issued by visiting analysts in the month after 
their site visits (i.e., Visit_ prev_month = 1). The variable of interest is the interaction term 
EF_Rev× Visit_ prev_month. The estimated coefficient on this variable captures the incremental 
effect of analysts’ site visits on the forecast response coefficient.  
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Table 9 reports the regression results. Consistent with prior literature, the market reaction is 
positively associated with forecast revisions (t = 6.26). More importantly, investors’ market 
reactions appear to be more responsive to the forecast revisions issued by visiting analysts than 
those issued by non-visiting analysts, as evidenced by the positive coefficient on the interaction 
term (t = 2.35). These findings triangulate the main finding by showing that site visits increase 
the credibility of visiting analysts’ forecast revisions.  
5.5 Site visit and local advantage 
Prior studies find that local analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate than those issued 
by non-local analysts, likely due to local analysts’ information advantage (Malloy 2005; Bae et 
al. 2008). Given our finding that analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after site visits, two 
questions arise. First, does conducting site visits contribute to the local analysts’ advantage? 
Second, can non-local analysts overcome their disadvantage by conducting site visits? 
Prior research suggests that site visits can be an information channel behind the local 
analysts’ advantage. For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) suggest that “investors located 
near a firm can visit the firm’s operations, talk to suppliers and employees, as well as assess the 
local market conditions in which the firm operates.” Bae et al. (2008) propose that local analysts 
have an advantage because they are able to gain access to a firm’s soft information, make on-site 
observations of the firm’s operation activities, and interact directly with the firm’s executives. To 
examine whether conducting site visits at least partially explains local analysts’ information 
advantage, we construct an indicator variable for non-local analysts (Non-local). We then 
estimate the following regression to investigate whether the effect of geographic proximity on 
forecast accuracy continues to hold after controlling for the effect of site visits: 
ẉⱡↄ_ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺṻⱷⱶ_ↄⱷẚẘↄ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṫݎⱡݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧																						ሺ6ሻ 
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The dependent variable, Rel_Accuracy, and Visit_freq are as defined in Section 5.3. The 
indicator variable, Non_local, equals 1 for the analysts whose brokerage firms are more than 400 
kilometers (or 250 miles) away from the visited firm’s headquarters, and 0 otherwise.  
Table 10 presents the regression results.21 Column (1) confirms that non-local analysts’ 
forecasts are less accurate than those issued by local analysts. The coefficient on Non-local is 
significantly negative (t = -2.86). Column (2) shows that consistent with the results reported in 
previous sections, forecasts issued by analysts with more site visits are more accurate, as shown 
by the positive coefficient on Visit_freq (t = 8.15). Column (3) includes both the local analyst 
indicator and site visit frequency. The coefficient on Non_local remains significantly negative (t 
= -2.39). The coefficient on Visit_freq also remains statistically significant (t = 7.99). The similar 
magnitude of the coefficients on Non_local in columns (1) and (3) (-0.0190 versus -0.0168) 
indicates that site visits are not the primary driver of local analysts’ advantage. 
We then investigate whether non-local analysts can overcome their disadvantage by 
conducting site visits. As non-local analysts benefit more from site visits than local analysts, we 
add an interaction term of Non-local and Visit_freq to Equation (6) and report the regression 
results in Column (4) of Table 10. The coefficient on Non_local continues to be significantly 
negative and the coefficient on Visit_freq continues to be significantly positive, although with a 
smaller magnitude. The coefficient on the interaction term is also significantly positive (t = 5.24), 
suggesting that the positive effect of site visits on forecast accuracy is more pronounced for 
non-local analysts than for local analysts. The net effect for non-local analysts who conduct site 
visit once is the sum of the three coefficients: -0.0300 + 0.0108 + 0.0364 = 0.0172, with a two-
                                                 
21 Following Bae et al. (2008), we require that at least one local analyst and one non-local analyst follow the sample 
firm-years. Such a requirement helps alleviate the concern that local and non-local analysts choose to follow firms 
with different fundamentals. In addition, we exclude the stale earnings forecasts, i.e., those issued more than 300 
days before earnings announcements. The final sample for this test consists of 17,714 earnings forecasts from July 
2009 to 2012. 
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sided p-value of 0.094 (untabulated). This suggests that the forecasts issued by non-local analysts 
who conduct one site visit are as accurate as those issued by local analysts who do not conduct 
site visits. If non-local analysts conduct two or more site visits to a firm (i.e., Visit_freq = 2), 
their forecasts are more accurate than those issued by local analysts who do not conduct site 
visits (-0.0300 + 2×0.0108 + 2×0.0364 = 0.0644, with a p-value of 0.01, untabulated). 
In summary, these analyses suggest that site visits are not the primary drivers of the local 
analysts’ advantage, as suggested in prior studies. The local advantage probably arises from 
other information channels, such as social networking with executives and employees and a 
better understanding of the local market and economic situation. However, our analyses indicate 
that conducting site visits can help non-local analysts to overcome their information 
disadvantage. 
5.6 Why do not all analysts conduct site visits? 
Our results so far suggest that analysts obtain useful information from their site visits (e.g., 
more accurate forecasts). One natural question that arises is why not all analysts conduct site 
visits to the firms they follow. In this section, we investigate the factors that affect analysts’ site 
visit decisions. We argue that analysts’ site visit decisions are affected by the tradeoff between 
the costs and benefits of conducting site visits. On the cost side, we expect that analysts are less 
likely to conduct site visits to firms located farther away from them or if they have more limited 
financial sources (i.e., working for a smaller broker). On the benefit side, as discussed above, we 
find that analysts’ visits to manufacturing firms, firms with more tangible assets, and firms with 
more concentrated business are more useful than other visits. Thus, we expect that financial 
analysts are more likely to visit these firms. We use the indicators for manufacturing firms 
(Manufacture), firms with high asset tangibility (Tangibility), and firms with high business 
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concentration (Concentration) as the proxies for the benefits.22  
To examine individual analysts’ decision to conduct site visits to a specific firm in a 
specific year, we generate a sample of analyst-firm-year observations where the analyst has 
issued at least one earnings forecast or stock recommendation for this firm in the previous or the 
current year. After imposing other data requirements, the final sample consists of 49,553 analyst-
firm-year observations for 1,395 unique firms over the sample period of 2009-2012.  
To capture the site visit decision, we use an indicator variable, Visit_firm, which equals one 
when an analyst conducts a site visit to the firm in the current year and zero otherwise. Visit_firm 
is coded as one for 25.1% of the sample. Table 11 reports the logistic regression results. First, 
consistent with our expectation on the costs of conducting site visits, we find that the coefficient 
on the geographical distance (Distance) is significantly negative (z-value = -7.84) and that on 
brokerage size is significantly positive (z-value= 5.38). These findings indicate that analysts are 
less likely to visit firms farther away from them or when they have more limited financial 
resources. On the benefit side, we find that analysts are more likely to conduct site visits to firms 
with higher level of asset tangibility and firms with higher level of business concentration; the 
coefficients on Tangibility and Concentration are significantly positive (z-value=2.77 and 2.84, 
respectively). We also find that the coefficient on Manufacture is positive, but not statistically 
significant (z-value =1.64).  
We include a series of control variables in the regression. We find that analysts are more 
likely to visit a firm if they have a favorable opinion towards it (StrongBuy), if the firm has a 
higher disclose rating (Disclosure_rating) and more analysts following (ANA), or if the firm is 
                                                 
22 We acknowledge that some of the factors affect both the costs and benefits. For example, while the cost of 
conducting site visits increases with geographical distance, the benefit also increases with it as analysts generally 
know less about geographically remote firms and thus the information obtained from the site visits is more important. 
As such, the results reflect the net effect. Also, this is by no means a comprehensive list of proxies for the costs and 
benefits of conducting site visits. 
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older (Age), but are less likely to visit state-owned enterprises (SOE).  
Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that the likelihood of analysts’ site 
visits increases with the expected benefits and decreases with the costs adherent to conducting 
site visits. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This study examines how a particular information acquisition activity, i.e., corporate site 
visits, affects analysts’ forecast performance. Unlike prior studies that use indirect proxies for 
analysts’ efforts to acquire information, we exploit the mandatory disclosure of analysts’ 
corporate site visits in China and directly capture analysts’ information acquisition activities. 
Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that visiting analysts experience an 
improvement in forecast accuracy after site visits compared to analysts who do not conduct site 
visits. In addition, the improvement is more pronounced for manufacturing firms, firms with 
more tangible assets, and firms with more concentrated business lines. Moreover, the 
improvement is larger when the visits are conducted by analysts only, when the visiting analysts 
are located at a greater geographical distance from the visited firms, and when the analysts’ site 
visits are preceded by fewer site visits. 
We conduct several additional analyses and find that our results are not driven by the 
potentially different attributes of visiting and non-visiting analysts or firms’ selective disclosure 
during site visits. Consistent with the notion that analysts obtain an information advantage 
through site visits, we document a stronger market response to the forecast revisions issued by 
visiting analysts than those by non-visiting analysts. Furthermore, we present evidence that site 
visits help non-local analysts to overcome their information disadvantage. Lastly, we conduct a 
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determinant analysis and find that the likelihood of analysts’ site visits increases with the 
expected benefits and decreases with the costs adherent to conducting site visits. 
This study contributes to the financial analyst literature by presenting evidence that the 
corporate site visit, a form of active information acquisition, has a positive effect on analysts’ 
forecast performance. Our empirical results on forecast accuracy are largely consistent with the 
insights obtained from our interviews with sell-side analysts, firm IR managers, and fund 
managers. The richness of the data provides many future research opportunities. For example, 
some analysts conduct site visits to firms that they do not cover. It will be interesting to examine 
the benefit of site visits to these analysts. Are they obtaining information on the peers, customers, 
suppliers of the firms they cover? Many analysts offer site visit services to their buy-side clients. 
It will be interesting to examine how exactly analysts benefit from offering such services. Do 
they obtain more commissions for their brokers? Do they obtain more votes as the top analysts of 
the industry? Starting from 2013, the detailed meeting minutes of site visits are available on the 
SZSE website. A textual analysis of these meeting transcripts can potentially enrich our 
understanding of the information acquisition process during the site visits. We leave these 
interesting questions to future research.   
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APPENDIX A 
A site visit example: Extract of the 2011 annual report of Shenzhen Airport Co. Ltd. 
 
During the reporting period, the company follows the information disclosure guidelines and investor 
relationship management bylaws issued by the SZSE. The company communicates with investors by 
hosting site visits and holding one-on-one meetings with institutional investors and by taking phone calls 
from individual investors.23 During the reporting period, the company meets with 54 individuals from 
various institutions. During these visits, the company discusses its general operations and future strategy 
with investors based on public information. The company does not selectively disclose information to 
investors. The site visits are detailed as follows. 
Time Visitor Topics of discussion and materials provided 
Jan. 5, 2011 Everbright Securities Recent company updates 
Jan. 11, 2011 China International Capital Co. Ltd. Recent company updates 
Jan. 21, 2011 Changjiang Securities, China Investment 
Securities 
Progress of construction and recent operations
Mar. 23, 2011 CITIC Securities  Recent company updates 
Mar. 24, 2011 Changjiang Securities, Baoying Fund 
Management, Huatai-PineBridge 
Investments 
Company operation and construction 
expansion 
Apr. 12, 2011 GF Securities, China Merchants Fund Construction of T3, and the business 
circumstances of main operations and 
non-flight-related operations 
Apr. 20, 2011 Guosen Securities, Harvest Fund, Guotai 
AMC, Sino Life Insurance, Dacheng 
Fund 
Company fundamentals 
May 12, 2011 Taikang AMC Company fundamentals 
May 19, 2011 Changjiang Securities, Chengrui 
Investment 
Construction of T3 and recent company 
updates 
June 10, 2011 Ping An Securities Recent company updates 
June 13, 2011 Hongyuan Securities Convertible bond and business circumstances 
June 23, 2011 Investor Conference hosted by 
Changjiang Securities 
Introduction of current business picture and 
topical issues 
Aug. 16, 2011 Bosera Securities, Dacheng Securities Fundamentals and convertible bond 
Aug. 19, 2011 Ping An Annuity Insurance  Company fundamentals 
Sep. 29, 2011 JS Cresvale Securities Company fundamentals 
Nov. 7, 2011 UBS Company fundamentals 
Nov. 17, 2011 China Merchants Fund Company fundamentals 
Dec. 8, 2011 Upstone Capital, Kangqiao Asset, Houde 
Investment 
Company fundamentals 
Dec. 14, 2011 Guotai Junan Company fundamentals 
Dec. 15, 2011 GF Securities Company fundamentals 
Dec. 19, 2011 Everbright Securities Company fundamentals 
                                                 
23 Companies occasionally include telephone interviews, performance illustration webinars, email exchanges, non-
deal road shows, investor conferences, industry summits, industry forums, annual broker conferences, non-deal road 
shows, and one-on-one meetings with managers in this section. We include only the site visit events (held at 
company headquarters or subsidiaries) in the current study. 
38 
 
APPENDIX B 
Variable definitions  
 
 
Dependent variable (site visit event-analyst group level variables) 
߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ െሺṿⱷݏݐ_ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṡṫṩ௞,௝,௧ െ ṿݎⱡ_ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṡṫṩ௞,௝,௧ሻ 
 = -1 times the change in the absolute forecast error of analyst group k 
(visiting or non-visiting analysts) for firm j from the six months before 
the site visit conducted on day t to one month after. A positive value 
implies an improvement in forecast accuracy from the pre- to post-visit 
periods. For each analyst group, we identify the most recent annual EPS 
forecast issued by each analyst within the group in the six months prior 
to the site visit event, calculate the group mean as the group consensus 
forecast, and calculate Pre_Visit_AFE as the absolute difference between 
the group consensus EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the year, expressed in percentage. To calculate 
Post_Visit_AFE, we identify the first forecast made by the analysts in the 
same group in the month after the site visit and calculate their forecast 
consensus and the absolute forecast error for the same group in the 
period after the site visit. For the analysts who do not update their 
forecasts in the post-visit period, we assume their post-visit forecasts to 
be the same as their pre-visit forecasts. If an analyst does not issue a pre-
visit earnings forecast (but does issue a post-visit earnings forecast), then 
we use the mean forecast of all of the other analysts’ forecasts in the pre-
visit period as the pre-visit forecast for such an analyst when calculating 
the forecast accuracy change. 
 
Key independent variable (site visit event-analyst group level variables) 
Visitk,j,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 for the visiting analyst group and 0 
for the non-visiting analyst group. An analyst is a visiting analyst if 
he/she visits firm j on a site visit event day t. The analysts who follow 
the same firm but do not visit it in the six months before or one month 
after the site visit of interest are referred to as non-visiting analysts.  
   
Variables for cross-sectional analyses (firm-year level and visiting group level variables) 
Manufacturej,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a manufacturing 
firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Tangibilityj,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the ratio of PP&E over total 
assets is greater than or equal to the sample median, and 0 otherwise.  
Concentrationj,t = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm’s Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) based on segment revenue is greater than or 
equal to the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Segment revenue HHI 
equals the sum of squares of the ratio of segment revenue to the total 
revenue for firm j in the current year. 
AnalystOnlyk,j,t = An indicator variable for analyst-only visits. It equals 1 if all of the 
visitors are sell-side analysts, and 0 otherwise. 
Remotek,j,t = An indicator variable for non-local analysts. It equals 1 if non-local 
analysts outnumber the local analysts in the visiting groups, and 0 
otherwise. Non-local analysts are those whose brokerage firms are 
located more than 400 kilometers (250 miles) away from the visited 
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firm’s headquarters. 
Unprecededk,j,t = An indicator variable for firms with fewer preceding visits within the 
month before the site visit of interest. It equals 1 if the number of 
preceding site visits that occurs within the one-month window before the 
current site visit t is below the sample median for the visiting group, and 
0 otherwise. This variable is coded as 0 for non-visiting groups. 
 
Control variables  
ΔHorizonk,j,t = Change in forecast horizon, calculated as the log transformation of the 
decrease in the average forecast horizon of analyst group k (visiting or 
non-visiting group) from the pre- to post-visit periods. The forecast 
horizon is defined as the number of days between the forecast issue date 
and corresponding earnings announcement date. 
Firmexpk,j,t = Analyst-firm-specific experience, calculated as the log transformation of 
the average firm-specific experience of all of the analysts in analyst 
group k for firm j. Firm-specific experience is calculated as the number 
of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm j and his/her current 
forecast for firm j. 
Brokersizek,j,t = Broker size, defined as the average number of analysts working for the 
brokers in group k. 
ANA_groupk,j,t = Group size, calculated as the log transformation of the number of 
analysts in group k.  
MVj,t = Firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of 
equity of firm j at the end of the last fiscal year. 
Inst_holdingj,t = Institutional ownership, calculated as the ownership percentage of 
institutional investors. 
Indepj,t = Board independence, calculated as the ratio of the number of 
independent directors to the total number of directors for firm j in the 
current year. 
BMj,t = Book-to-market ratio, calculated as the book value of equity divided by 
the market value of equity. 
Growthj,t = Revenue growth, defined as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue 
in year t-1. 
Lossj,t = Loss indicator that equals 1 if the net income is negative in year t, and 0 
otherwise. 
BHARj,t = The buy and hold market-adjusted returns in year t. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection 
This table reports the sample selection procedure for our sample of analysts’ site visits during 2009-2012. 
  
No. of total 
site visits 
No. of total 
firms 
1. Site visits involving sell-side analysts 
 
 18,259 1,298
2. Combining site visits with adjacent event dates as one event 
and using the first day as the event day 
 
 16,913 1,269 
3. Requiring visiting analysts as a group to issue at least one 
earnings forecast during the 18 months before the 
forthcoming earnings announcement date 
 9,730 1,105 
    
4. Requiring visiting and non-visiting analysts to issue at least 
one earnings forecast during the six months before and one 
month after the site visit 
 
 7,154 965 
5. Dropping financial firms and events with missing values for 
control variables 
 6,651 931 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics  
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the main analyses. The sample includes 
6,651 site visit events and 13,302 observations with required data, including 6,651 observations from the 
visiting groups and 6,651 observations from the non-visiting groups. Please see Appendix B for the 
variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate that the difference between visiting and non-visiting groups in 
the corresponding variable is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Variables Obs. Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
For visiting analyst group       
Pre-visit forecast errors 6,651 1.241 1.955 1.609 0.659* 0.231 
Post-visit forecast errors 6,651 1.077*** 1.771 1.359 0.533*** 0.183 
ΔAccuracy  6,651 0.164*** 0.869 0.000 0.000*** 0.090 
Pre-visit horizon  6,651 183.765*** 67.532 126.400 186.000*** 241.000 
Post-visit horizon  6,651 126.125*** 66.916 71.000 125.000*** 185.000 
ΔHorizon (raw)  6,651 57.641*** 30.182 33.000 53.000*** 77.000 
Firmexp  6,651 2.435*** 1.865 1.000 2.000*** 3.000 
Brokersize  6,651 33.691*** 12.559 26.000 33.333*** 42.000 
ANA_group  6,651 1.385*** 0.934 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
For non-visiting analyst group       
Pre-visit forecast errors 6,651  1.242 2.038 1.588 0.699 0.248 
Post-visit forecast errors 6,651  1.201 2.103 1.524 0.671 0.237 
ΔAccuracy 6,651 0.041 0.557 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Pre-visit horizon  6,651 190.310 64.901 129.537 195.800 244.333 
Post-visit horizon  6,651 121.053 66.322 66.200 121.000 180.000 
ΔHorizon (raw)  6,651 69.256 23.491 52.889 67.612 84.316 
Firmexp  6,651 2.243 1.236 1.250 2.000 3.000 
Brokersize  6,651 28.774 7.424 24.500 28.571 32.750 
ANA_group  6,651 7.234 5.120 3.000 6.000 10.000 
Control variables  
MV (raw, in millions RMB) 6,651 10,317 15,002 3,113 5,464 10,527 
NI_std 6,651 0.050 0.050 0.020 0.040 0.070 
Inst_holding 6,651 0.440 0.240 0.250 0.440 0.630 
Indep 6,651 0.370 0.060 0.330 0.330 0.400 
BM 6,651 0.360 0.200 0.210 0.320 0.460 
Growth 6,651 0.280 0.340 0.080 0.230 0.390 
Loss 6,651 0.010 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BHAR 6,651 0.150 0.470 -0.100 0.010 0.290 
Variables for the cross-sectional analyses 
Manufacture 6,651 0.661 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PP&E/Assets  6,651 0.232 0.165 0.105 0.200 0.317 
SegHHI 6,567 0.604 0.250 0.411 0.633 0.796 
AnalystOnly (visiting group) 6,651 0.370 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Remote (visiting group) 6,648 0.727 0.446 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Unpreceded (visiting group) 
(raw number of preceding visits) 6,651 1.690 1.800 0.000 1.000 3.000 
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TABLE 3 
The change in forecast accuracy for visiting and non-visiting analyst groups around site visits 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator 
and control variables: 
	߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺ߂ⱨⱷݎⱪݖⱷⱶ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛῼṫⱪݎⅎⱡݔ݌௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾨṣݎⱷⱴⱡݎݏⱪݖⱡ௞,௝,௧ 	
൅ ߛᾬṡṻṡ_ⱦݎⱷݑ݌௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ߛᾪṹẑ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾮṻṱ_ݏݐẛ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾩṱⱶݏݐ_ⱨⱷↄẛⱪⱶⱦ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾭṱⱶẛⱡ݌௝,௧
൅ ߛᾫṣṹ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺΏṭݎⱷݓݐⱨ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺῺṷⱷݏݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺῼṣṯṡẉ௝,௧ ൅ ṱⱶẛݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧.																		 
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). The full sample consists of 13,302 observations from 2009 to 2012. For each site 
visit, there is one observation for the visiting analyst group and one observation for the non-visiting 
analyst group. The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. 
***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 Coeff. (t-value) 
Visit (H1: +) 0.1292*** 
(5.13) 
ΔHorizon 0.0582*** 
(8.23) 
Firmexp -0.0014 
(-0.20) 
Brokersize -0.0384* 
(-1.92) 
ANA_group 0.0073 
(0.75) 
MV -0.0265** 
 (-2.53) 
NI_std 0.2977*** 
 (4.74) 
Inst_holding 0.0444 
(0.97) 
Indep -0.0176 
(-0.26) 
BM 0.1235*** 
 (2.58) 
Growth -0.0380 
 (-1.12) 
Loss 0.2506** 
 (2.36) 
BHAR 0.0107 
 (0.80) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 13,302 
Adj. R2 0.039 
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TABLE 4 
The effect of firm characteristics on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits  
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼṫⱪݎⅎ_ẚⱨẘݎ௝,௧ ൅ ߚᾨẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ṫⱪݎⅎ_ẚⱨẘݎ௝,௧ ൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅
ߝ௞,௝,௧	.    
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). Firm_char is the indicator for manufacturing firms (Manufacture) in Column (1), 
the asset tangibility level (Tangibility) in Column (2) and the business concentration level (Concentration) 
in Column (3).  
 
The full sample consists of 13,302 observations from 2009 to 2012. For each site visit, there is one 
observation for the visiting analyst group and one observation for the non-visiting analyst group. The t-
values in brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * 
indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed statistical tests. Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
 Column (1)
Firm_char  
= Manufacture
Column (2)
Firm_ char  
= Tangibility
Column (3)
Firm_ char  
= Concentration
Visit  0.1096*** 0.1121*** 0.1005*** 
 (4.28) (6.25) (3.00) 
Firm_char -0.0116 0.0027 0.0127 
 (-0.31) (0.49) (1.13) 
Visit×Firm_char (H2:+) 0.0294** 0.0354** 0.0524*** 
 (2.08) (2.30) (2.81) 
ΔHorizon 0.0581*** 0.0584*** 0.0591*** 
 (8.21) (8.12) (7.61) 
Firmexp -0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0038 
 (-0.24) (-0.40) (-0.60) 
Brokersize -0.0377* -0.0365* -0.0386* 
 (-1.87) (-1.82) (-1.87) 
ANA_group 0.0072 0.0078 0.0091 
 (0.73) (0.80) (0.93) 
MV -0.0265** -0.0262** -0.0280*** 
 (-2.52) (-2.48) (-2.74) 
NI_std 0.2974*** 0.3215*** 0.2969*** 
 (4.73) (5.60) (4.18) 
Inst_holding 0.0445 0.0416 0.0370 
 (0.97) (0.92) (0.78) 
Indep -0.0177 -0.0081 -0.0204 
 (-0.26) (-0.12) (-0.31) 
BM 0.1236** 0.1165** 0.1229** 
 (2.58) (2.36) (2.57) 
Growth -0.0380 -0.0380 -0.0379 
 (-1.12) (-1.14) (-1.10) 
Loss 0.2506** 0.2453** 0.2481** 
 (2.36) (2.32) (2.33) 
BHAR 0.0107 0.0098 0.0092 
 (0.80) (0.70) (0.71) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 13,302 13,302 13,134 
Adj. R2 0.039 0.039 0.040 
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 TABLE 5 
The effect of visitors’ characteristics on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits 
This table presents the results of the following regression: 
߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ẚⱨẘݎ௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to the post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). Visit_char is the analyst-only visit indicator (AnalystOnly) in Column (1), the 
remote visit indicator (Remote) in Column (2), the indicator for fewer proceeding site visits (Unpreceded) 
in Column (3). These variables are coded as 0 for non-visiting groups. The full sample consists of 13,302 
observations from 2009 to 2012, with one for visiting and one for non-visiting analyst group for each site 
visit. The t-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * 
indicate the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance levels. Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
Column (1) 
Visit_char = AnalystOnly 
Column (2) 
Visit_char = Remote 
Column (3) 
Visit_char = Unpreceded 
Visit  0.1034*** 0.0933*** 0.1093*** 
 (4.23) (4.01) (5.58) 
Visit×Visit_char (H3: +) 0.0787*** 0.0509*** 0.0318*** 
 (7.07) (9.90) (2.84) 
ΔHorizon 0.0561*** 0.0580*** 0.0591*** 
(8.01) (8.20) (8.19) 
Firmexp -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0017 
(-0.20) (-0.07) (-0.25) 
Brokersize -0.0308 -0.0385* -0.0378* 
(-1.63) (-1.95) (-1.90) 
ANA_group 0.0115 0.0083 0.0053 
(1.22) (0.84) (0.58) 
MV -0.0277*** -0.0276*** -0.0249** 
 (-2.80) (-2.64) (-2.44) 
NI_std 0.3159*** 0.3024*** 0.2877*** 
 (5.52) (4.86) (4.82) 
Inst_holding 0.0456 0.0429 0.0464 
(1.02) (0.95) (1.02) 
Indep -0.0179 -0.0134 -0.0176 
 (-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.27) 
BM 0.1176** 0.1231** 0.1211** 
 (2.50) (2.55) (2.56) 
Growth -0.0388 -0.0377 -0.0377 
 (-1.20) (-1.11) (-1.11) 
Loss 0.2491** 0.2474** 0.2485** 
 (2.33) (2.33) (2.35) 
BHAR 0.0113 0.0108 0.0104 
 (0.86) (0.79) (0.80) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,302 13,296 13,302 
Adj. R2 0.043 0.040 0.039 
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TABLE 6 
Analysts’ site visits and the level of forecast accuracy 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼṿⱷݏݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߚᾨẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൈ ṿⱷݏݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
Columns (1) and (2) report the regression results of the forecast accuracy level on the visit indicator and 
control variables before and after the site visit date, respectively. Column (3) reports the regression results 
of the forecast accuracy level on the visit indicator, the post-visit indicator, their interaction term, and the 
control variables.  
 
Accuracy is calculated as -1 times the forecast errors in the pre- (Pre_visit_AFE) or post-visit 
(Post_visit_AFE) periods. A higher value implies a higher level of forecast accuracy. The post-visit 
indicator (Post) equals 1 for post-site-visit observations, and 0 otherwise. Horizon is the forecast horizon, 
calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast issue date and corresponding earnings 
announcement date. Please see Appendix B for definitions of other variables. The full sample consists of 
26,604 observations from 2009 to 2012. The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for 
firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Column (1) 
Accuracy  
before site visit 
Column (2) 
Accuracy  
after site visit 
Column (3) 
Accuracy 
Full sample 
Visit  -0.0068 0.1056*** -0.0049 
 (-0.35) (3.07) (-0.24) 
Post   0.0451*** 
   (6.24) 
Visit×Post (H1: +)   0.1084*** 
   (5.67) 
Horizon -0.6069*** -0.5879*** -0.5974*** 
(-3.04) (-3.28) (-3.15) 
Firmexp -0.2380*** -0.2483*** -0.2433*** 
(-4.29) (-4.97) (-4.63) 
Brokersize 0.0212 -0.0187 0.0013 
(0.42) (-0.27) (0.02) 
ANA_group 0.1263*** 0.1144*** 0.1204*** 
(6.63) (6.08) (6.63) 
MV 0.1505 0.1364 0.1435 
 (1.47) (1.47) (1.47) 
NI_std -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0018 
 (-0.94) (-1.21) (-1.07) 
Inst_holding -0.0536 -0.0462 -0.0498 
(-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
Indep -0.9623* -1.0193** -0.9907** 
 (-1.91) (-2.21) (-2.06) 
BM -1.3967*** -1.2814*** -1.3390*** 
 (-4.13) (-3.87) (-4.01) 
Growth -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (-3.03) (-3.33) (-3.17) 
Loss -3.6138*** -3.2916*** -3.4527*** 
 (-19.21) (-28.35) (-23.87) 
BHAR -0.0035 0.0069 0.0017 
 (-0.03) (0.07) (0.01) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
Observations 13,302 13,302 26,604 
Adj. R2 0.273 0.263 0.269 
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TABLE 7 
The change in forecast accuracy for visiting and non-visiting analyst groups around site visits:  
(1) excluding non-visiting analysts that do not conduct site visits  
(2) excluding analysts who issued strong-buy recommendations or had investment banking 
relationship  
 
This table replicates Table 3 after imposing additional data requirement. Column (1) reports the results 
after excluding non-visiting analysts that do not conduct site visits to the firm over the sample period. 
This additional data requirement results in a sample of 10,788 observations. Column (2) reports the 
results after excluding analysts who issued strong-buy recommendations in the year prior to site visits or 
those who had investment banking relationship with the firm in the past. This additional data requirement 
results in a sample of 9,798 observations. The regression model is: 
 
	߂ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௞,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚẑⱪݏⱪݐ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺ߂ⱨⱷݎⱪݖⱷⱶ௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛῼṫⱪݎⅎⱡݔ݌௞,௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾨṣݎⱷⱴⱡݎݏⱪݖⱡ௞,௝,௧ 	
൅ ߛᾬṡṻṡ_ⱦݎⱷݑ݌௞,௝,௧ 	൅ ߛᾪṹẑ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾮṻṱ_ݏݐẛ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾩṱⱶݏݐ_ⱨⱷↄẛⱪⱶⱦ௝,௧ ൅ ߛᾭṱⱶẛⱡ݌௝,௧
൅ ߛᾫṣṹ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺΏṭݎⱷݓݐⱨ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺῺṷⱷݏݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߛῺῼṣṯṡẉ௝,௧ ൅ ṱⱶẛݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧.																		 
 
The dependent variable is the forecast accuracy change for an analyst group from the pre- to post-visit 
periods (ΔAccuracy). For each site visit, there is one observation for the visiting analyst group and one 
observation for the non-visiting analyst group. The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see Appendix B for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 7 (Cont’d) 
 
Column (1) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (2) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Visit (H1: +) 0.1184*** 0.1446*** 
(6.94) (5.67) 
ΔHorizon 0.0469*** 0.0577*** 
(5.44) (5.81) 
Firmexp -0.0011 0.0013 
(-0.13) (0.32) 
Brokersize -0.0321* -0.0378* 
(-1.85) (-1.89) 
ANA_group 0.0175*** 0.0131 
(3.93) (0.91) 
MV -0.0296*** -0.0311** 
 (-3.46) (-2.28) 
NI_std 0.3579*** 0.2272*** 
 (4.53) (3.20) 
Inst_holding 0.0492 0.0530 
(1.18) (1.00) 
Indep 0.0054 -0.0665 
(0.05) (-0.74) 
BM 0.1234** 0.1401** 
 (2.00) (2.43) 
Growth -0.0222 -0.0545 
 (-0.59) (-1.27) 
Loss 0.1917*** 0.2696** 
 (12.24) (2.47) 
BHAR 0.0002 0.0140 
 (0.01) (0.71) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Observations 10,788 9,798 
Adj. R2 0.034 0.041 
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TABLE 8 
 Comparisons based on the same-analyst observations 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ẉⱡↄ_ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṫݎⱡݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧																						 
 
In Columns (1), we focus on analyst-year pairs where the analyst visits some firms but not other firms in 
the same year. We require that the analyst issues forecasts for both types of firms. The sample consists of 
26,103 analyst-firm-year observations from 2009 to 2012. 
 
In Column (2), we focus on analyst-firm pairs, where the analyst visits the firm in some years, but not in 
other years. We further require that the analyst issues forecasts for the firm in both periods. The sample 
consists of 5,469 analyst-firm-year observations from 2009 to 2012. 
 
The t-values in brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * 
indicate coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed statistical tests.  
 
Variable definition: 
 
Rel_Accuracyi,j,t  = analyst i’s relative forecast accuracy, measured as the difference between the forecast 
error of analyst i for firm j’s year t earnings and the average forecast error across all 
analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, divided by the average absolute forecast 
error across all analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, then multiplied by -1. A 
higher value implies a higher level of forecast accuracy. For each analyst, we calculate 
the forecast error using the analyst’s most recent annual earnings forecast issued in the 
year before the firm’s earnings announcement. 
Visit_freqi,j,t  = site visit frequency, measured as the number of site visits conducted by analyst i in 
the six-month period before the issuance date of the most recent earnings forecast used 
to calculate the analyst’s forecast accuracy; or the period between the last year’s 
earnings announcement date and the issuance date of the most recent earnings forecast, 
whichever period is longer. Visit_freq equals 2 (1, 0) if analyst i visited firm j two or 
more (once, zero) times during this period. 
Horizoni,j,t  = forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast 
issue date and corresponding earnings announcement dates. 
Firmexpi,j,t  = analyst’s firm-specific experience, calculated as the log transformation of the time 
interval in years between analyst i’s first forecast for firm j and his/her forecast at time t 
for firm j. 
Genexpi,t  = analyst’s general experience, calculated as the log transformation of the time interval 
in years between analyst i’s first forecast in the CSMAR database and his/her current 
forecast at time t. 
Brokersizei,t  = broker size, calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage firm with 
which analyst i is associated. 
Numindi,t  = industry coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of CSRC 
Level-2 industries analyst i covers. 
MVj,t  = firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of equity of firm j 
at the end of last fiscal year. 
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TABLE 8 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Column (1) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Column (2) 
Coeff. 
(t-value) 
Visit_freq_  0.0462*** 0.0413*** 
 (10.63) (4.36) 
Horizon -0.2819*** -0.2608*** 
(-5.74) (-4.31) 
Firmexp 0.1152*** 0.0642 
(6.30) (1.55) 
Genexp 0.0138 -0.0109 
(1.06) (-0.75) 
Brokersize 0.0158 0.0065 
(0.93) (0.21) 
Numind -0.0282 -0.0077 
(-0.71) (-0.22) 
MV 0.0102* 0.0010 
 (1.74) (0.07) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 26,103 5,469 
Adj. R2 0.090 0.083 
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TABLE 9 
Site visits and market reaction 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ṥṡẉ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺṩṫ_ẉⱡݒ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼẑⱪݏⱪݐ_݌ݎⱡݒ_ⅎⱷⱶݐⱨ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚᾨṩṫ_ẉⱡݒ௜,௝,௧ ൈ ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_݌ݎⱡݒ_ⅎⱷⱶݐⱨ௜,௝,௧
൅ ᅷṥⱷⱶݐݎⱷↄݏ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧	 
 
The full sample consists of 17,317 earnings forecast revisions issued between 2009 and 2012. We require 
the sample firms to have at least one earnings forecast revision with Visit_ prev_month = 1 and at least 
one earnings forecast revision with Visit_ prev_month = 0. The t-values in brackets are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients that are significant at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
 
Variable definition: 
 
CARi,j,t  = cumulative abnormal returns in the (-1, +1) window around the earnings forecast 
revision. The daily abnormal return is calculated as the firm’s return on day t minus 
the daily return of a benchmark portfolio with the same size decile as the firm. 
EF_Revi,j,t  = analyst forecast revision, calculated as the difference between the analyst’s current 
annual earnings forecast and the same analyst’s prior forecast, scaled by the stock 
price at the end of the month before the revision. 
Visit_prev_monthi,j,t  = indicator variable for site visit. It equals 1 if analyst i visits firm j during the 
month before the current earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. 
Revenue_Forecasti,j,t  = indicator variable for revenue forecast. It equals 1 if the earnings forecast is 
accompanied by a revenue forecast, and 0 otherwise. 
Horizoni,j,t  = forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast 
issuance date and the subsequent earnings announcement date. 
Numcomi,t  = firm coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of firms covered 
by analyst i. 
Numindi,t  = industry coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of CSRC 
Level-2 industries covered by analyst i. 
Brokersizei,t  = broker size, calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage firm 
with which analyst i is associated. 
Stari,t  = indicator variable for star analysts. 
Genexpi,t  = analyst’s general experience, calculated as the log transformation of the time 
interval in years between analyst i’s first forecast in the CSMAR database and 
his/her current forecast at time t. 
FEi,j,t,  = forecast error, calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the actual 
earnings and analyst i’s forecast, scaled by the firm’s stock price in the last year. 
MVj,t  = firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of equity of 
firm j at the end of the last fiscal year. 
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TABLE 9 (Cont’d) 
 
 Coeff. (t-value) 
EF_Rev 0.2537*** 
 (6.26) 
EF_Rev× Visit_prev_month 0.0448** 
 (2.35) 
Visit_ prev_month 0.0031*** 
 (3.54) 
Revenue_Forecast -0.0022 
 (-1.07) 
Horizon -0.0003** 
 (-2.19) 
Numcom -0.0015 
 (-1.42) 
Numind 0.0019 
 (0.97) 
Brokersize -0.0003 
(-0.24) 
Star 0.0040*** 
(2.91) 
Genexp -0.0003 
(-0.36) 
FE 0.2117*** 
 (8.29) 
MV -0.0003 
 (-0.63) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Observations 17,317 
Adj. R2 0.021 
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TABLE 10 
Site visits and local advantage 
 
This table presents the results from the following regression: 
 
ẉⱡↄ_ṡẚẚݑݎẘẚݕ௜,௝,௧
ൌ α ൅ ߚῺṻⱷⱶ_ↄⱷẚẘↄ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚῼẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṫݎⱡݍ௜,௝,௧ ൅ ߚᾨṻⱷⱶ_ↄⱷẚẘↄ௜,௝,௧ ൈ ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ṫݎⱡݍ௜,௝,௧
൅ ʠ	ɓɸɷɽɻɸɵɼ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧													 
 
The full sample consists of 17,714 analyst forecasts issued from 2009 to 2012. As in Bae et al. (2008), the 
control variables are demeaned by firm-year averages. The t-values in brackets are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients that are significant at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests.  
 
Variable definition: 
Rel_Accuracyi,j,t  = analyst i’s relative forecast accuracy, measured as the difference between the forecast 
error of analyst i for firm j’s year t earnings and the average forecast error across all 
analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, divided by the average absolute forecast 
error across all analyst forecasts of firm j’s year t earnings, then multiplied by -1. A 
higher value implies a higher level of forecast accuracy. For each analyst, we calculate 
the forecast error by using this analyst’s most recent annual earnings forecast issued in 
the year before the firm’s earnings announcement. 
Non_locali,j,t  = indicator variable for non-local analysts. It equals 1 for analyst i whose brokerage 
firm is more than 400 kilometers (250 miles) away from the headquarters of firm j, and 
0 otherwise. 
Visit_freqi,j,t  = site visit frequency, measured as the number of site visits conducted by analyst i in 
the six-month period before the issuance date of the current earnings forecast used to 
calculate the analyst’s forecast accuracy, or the period between last year’s earnings 
announcement date and the current earnings forecast issuance date, whichever period is 
longer. Visit_freq equals 2 (1, 0) if analyst i visited firm j two or more (once, zero) 
times during this period. 
Horizoni,j,t  = forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days between the forecast 
issue date and corresponding earnings announcement dates. 
Firmexpi,j,t  = analyst’s firm-specific experience, calculated as the log transformation of the time 
interval in years between analyst i’s first forecast for firm j and his/her forecast at time t 
for firm j. 
Genexpi,t  = analyst’s general experience, calculated as the log transformation of the time interval 
in years between analyst i’s first forecast in the CSMAR database and his/her current 
forecast at time t. 
Brokersizei,t  = broker size, calculated as the number of analysts working for the brokerage firm with 
which analyst i is associated. 
Numindi,t  = industry coverage, calculated as the log transformation of the number of CSRC 
Level-2 industries analyst i covers. 
MVj,t  = firm size, calculated as the log transformation of the market value of equity of firm j 
at the end of last fiscal year. 
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TABLE 10 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Column (1) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (2) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (3) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
Column (4) 
Coeff. 
(t-value)
 
Non_local -0.0190***  -0.0168** -0.0300***  
 (-2.86)  (-2.39) (-3.96)  
Visit_freq  0.0364*** 0.0359*** 0.0108***  
  (8.15) (7.99) (2.96)  
Non_local×Visit_freq    0.0364***  
    (5.24)  
Horizon -0.2734*** -0.2711*** -0.2711*** -0.2711***  
(-6.80) (-6.71) (-6.72) (-6.71)  
Firmexp 0.1450*** 0.1429*** 0.1424*** 0.1424***  
(5.37) (5.50) (5.42) (5.44)  
Genexp 0.0147 0.0157 0.0152 0.0151  
(1.08) (1.14) (1.12) (1.12)  
Brokersize 0.0195 0.0161 0.0161 0.0158  
(0.73) (0.60) (0.60) (0.59)  
Numind  -0.0365 -0.0368 -0.0361 -0.0357  
 (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.18) (-1.18)  
MV 0.0096*** 0.0093*** 0.0098*** 0.0097***  
 (4.02) (2.84) (2.94) (2.83)  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
     
Observations 17,714 17,714 17,714 17,714  
Adj. R2 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.084  
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TABLE 11 
Determinants of analyst site visits 
 
This table reports the results from the following regression: 
 
ẑⱪݏⱪݐ_ⱥⱪݎⅎ௜,௝,௧ ൌ α ൅ ߚῺṧⱪݏݐẘⱶẚⱡ௜,௝,௧ିῺ
൅ ߚῼṣݎⱷⱴⱡݎݏⱪݖⱡ௜,௧ିῺ൅ߚᾨṹẘⱶݑⱥẘẚݐݑݎⱡ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚᾬẍẘⱶⱦⱪẙⱪↄⱪݐݕ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚᾪṥⱷⱶẚⱡⱶݐݎẘݐⱪⱷⱶ௝,௧ିῺ
൅ ߚᾮẋݐݎⱷⱶⱦṣݑݕ௜,௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚᾩṧⱪݏẚↄⱷݏݑݎⱡ_ݎẘݐⱪⱶⱦ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚᾭṡṻṡ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚᾫẋṽṩ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚῺΏṹẑ௝,௧ିῺ
൅ ߚῺῺẉṽṡ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚῺῼṡⱦⱡ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚῺᾨṣṹ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߚῺᾬṧⱡẙݐ௝,௧ିῺ ൅ ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
The full sample consists of 49,553 analyst-firm-year observations in the period of 2009 to 2012. The z-
values are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, * 
indicate the coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed statistical tests.  
 
Please see Appendix B for the measurements of Manufacture, Tangibility, Concentration, MV, and BM, 
except that they are measured in year t-1. The measurements of other variables are as follows: 
 
Visit_firmi,j,t = Indicator for site visit, 1 if analyst i visits firm j at least once in year t, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Distancei,j,t-1 = The natural logarithm of the geographical distances (in kilometers) 
between analyst i and the visited firm j’s headquarters. 
Brokersizei,t-1 = Broker size, defined as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts 
working for the brokers. 
StrongBuy i,j,t-1 = An indicator variable that equals 1 when analyst i issue at least one 
strong-buy recommendation for firm j in year t-1. 
Disclosure_rating j,t-1 = Indicator for high disclosure rating, based on the rating of information 
disclosure quality assigned by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to the listed 
companies, with four categories, A, B, C, and D. The indicator variable 
is equal to 1 if the disclosure rating for firm j in year t-1 is A or B, and 0 
otherwise. 
ANA j,t-1 = Analyst coverage, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the total 
number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts in year t-1. 
SOE j,t-1 = Indicator variable for SEO firms, 1 if firm j is a state-owned enterprise in 
year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
ROA j,t-1 = Return of assets, calculated as the net income divided by total assets of 
firm j in year t-1.  
Age j,t-1 = Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of 
years the company has been listed up to the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Debt j,t-1 = The ratio of total debt divided by total assets in year t-1. 
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TABLE 11 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Coeff. 
(z-value) 
Variables related to the cost of conducting site visits  
Distance -0.1028*** 
(-7.84) 
Brokersize 0.5847*** 
 (5.38) 
Variables related to the benefit of conducting site visits  
Manufacture 0.0715 
(1.64) 
Tangibility 0.0770*** 
(2.77) 
Concentration 0.0576*** 
(2.84) 
 
Control variables  
StrongBuy 0.1328* 
 (1.87) 
Disclosure_rating 0.1664*** 
(4.38) 
ANA 0.1809*** 
(9.77) 
SOE -0.2576*** 
(-6.79) 
MV 0.0059 
(0.20) 
ROA -0.3379 
(-1.15) 
Age 0.0423*** 
(7.74) 
BM 0.1069 
(1.43) 
Debt 0.0108 
 (0.11) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Observations 49,553 
Pesudo-R2 0.0434 
 
 
